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Abstract Reconciliation is a crucial procedure in post-processing of contin-
uous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system, which is used to
make two distant legitimate parties share identical corrected keys. The adap-
tive reconciliation is necessary and important for practical systems to cope
with the variable channel. Many researchers adopt the punctured LDPC codes
to implement adaptive reconciliation. In this paper, a novel rateless reconcil-
iation protocol based on spinal code is proposed, which can achieve a high-
efficiency and adaptive reconciliation in a larger range of SNRs. Due to the
short codes length and simple structure, our protocol is easy to implement
without the complex codes designs of fixed rate codes, e.g., LDPC codes.
Meanwhile, the structure of our protocol is highly parallel, which is suitable
for hardware implementation, thus it also has the potential of high-speed hard-
ware implementation. Besides, the security of proposed protocol is proved in
theory. Experiment results show that the reconciliation efficiency maintains
around 95% for ranging SNRs in a larger range (0,0.5), even exceeds 96.5%
at extremely low SNR (≤ 0.03) by using this novel scheme. The proposed
protocol makes the long-distance CV-QKD systems much easier and stable to
perform a high-performance and adaptive reconciliation.
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1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art of distributing provably uncon-
ditional security keys between two remote legitimate parties Alice and Bob
by encoding information on photons, even if in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per (Eve). The QKD protocols mainly contains discrete-variable (DV) proto-
cols [1–7] and continuous-variable (CV) protocols [8–13]. DV-QKD protocols
encode key information on discrete variables such as the phase or the po-
larization of single photons. CV-QKD protocols encodes key information on
continuous variables such as the quadratures of coherent states. The limitation
and technological challenges of DV-QKD mainly lie in the speed and efficiency
of photon detectors in the single-photon regime. Compared to DV-QKD pro-
tocols, CV-QKD modulate and detect the coherent states efficiently by using
standard telecommunication technologies, which allows one to eliminate these
constraints of DV-QKD.
Generally, a CV-QKD system is carried out in two consecutive phases,
namely, the quantum key establishment phase and the classical post-processing
phase. In the former phase of a practical Gaussian-modulated coherent state
CV-QKD system [8], Alice prepares coherent state using two random values
XA, PA with a Gaussian distribution N(0, VA) and sends it to Bob via the
quantum channel. Bob randomly chooses to measure one of the two quadra-
tures of the received coherent state and then informs Alice of his choice of
quadrature. Due to the physical noises or the presence of Eve [14], Alice and
Bob share weakly correlated and insecure continuous-variable raw data. Thus,
the latter phase called post-processing must be performed to extract iden-
tical secret keys from the correlated raw data via a classical authenticated
channel. The post-processing contains four main stages: sifting, parameter es-
timation [15,16], reconciliation [17–20] and privacy amplification [21,22]. The
reconciliation stage is aim to correct errors of the correlated raw data, which
plays a crucial role in practical CV-QKD systems since its performance affects
both the final secret key rate and transmission distance [23–25]. Implementing
high-performance reconciliation is the main bottleneck of post-processing for
long-distance CV-QKD systems [26].
Up to now, a series of reconciliation schemes have been explored for CV-
QKD system. The earliest scheme called sign reconciliation uses the sign of
the correlated continuous variable to get quantized bit string and then correct
error bits [27]. Although sign reconciliation has the advantage of simplicity,
it is only efficient in the case of high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Accord-
ingly, Assche proposed a scheme called slice error correction (SEC) [28, 29].
Although SEC reconciliation can distill more than 1 bit per pulse in princi-
ple, but its secure transmission distance is limited to about 30 km. Leverrier
subsequently proposed a promising scheme called multidimensional reconcili-
ation [30], and it theoretically extended the secure transmission distance from
30 km to 50-100 km. Afterward, to pursue higher reconciliation speed or ef-
ficiency, multidimensional reconciliation scheme has been applied in several
works with Polar code [31], LDPC code [32–35], and especially with Multi-
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edge type LDPC code (MET-LDPC) at low SNR regime [18, 19]. Whether
Polar codes or LDPC codes are just applicable to some specific SNR. Since
the imperfect of optical sources or other factors, the practical SNR might
vary among transmissions significantly. When the practical SNR differs from
the code’s most suitable SNR, the reconciliation efficiency will be decreased.
Therefore, some adaptive reconciliation algorithms with LDPC code are pro-
posed in an attempt to emulate rateless operation and cope with the varying
SNR by puncturing the LDPC codes [18, 34]. However, the punctured LDPC
codes still perform high performance only in a small range. This forces the
use of many different LDPC check matrices to cover a broad range of SNR in
pursuit of high-performance reconciliation. As we all known, the matrix design
of LDPC codes with high performance is also extremely difficult, especially for
the long block length LDPC code which usually performs better than short
code. In addition, a set of check matrices of long block length LDPC codes
will forces Alice and Bob to consume lots of storage resources. With the fast
increase in the repetition frequency of quantum channel, the storage resource
of post-processing devices is facing unprecedented challenges, especially for
the post-processing implementation based on FPGA [36].
In this paper, we propose a novel rateless reconciliation protocol for CV-
QKD system based on Spinal code. Since the rateless operation, the proposed
protocol can achieve a high-performance and adaptive reconciliation in a large
range of SNRs and even the estimated SNR value differing from its true value
of practical systems. In addition, we proved the security of the proposed pro-
tocol, which indicates that the privacy amplification is no more needed if the
block size of reconciliation reaches 108 bits. Being compared with the adap-
tive reconciliation schemes using the punctured LDPC codes, our proposed
rateless reconciliation protocol does not need to design the check matrices for
different SNRs, which greatly reduces the design cost and memory resource
consumption. Simulation experiments show that the reconciliation efficiency
of our protocol can achieve about 95% for the ranging SNRs in a larger range
(0, 0.5), even exceeds 96.5% at extremely low SNR (≤ 0.03) with almost 0%
FER. Therefore, our proposed protocol makes it much easier and stable for
long-distance CV-QKD system to perform a high-performance and adaptive
reconciliation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, the principle
of spinal codes are introduced. In Sect. 3, we propose a novel reconciliation
protocols for CV-QKD system based on spinal codes and discussed its security
and performance. In Sect. 4, the simulation results and analysis of the novel
reconciliation scheme are shown. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sect. 5.
2 Spinal Code
The spinal code is a class of rateless codes [37], which has been proven to
achieve Shannon capacity for the binary symmetric channel (BSC) and the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with an efficient polynomial-
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time encoder and decoder [38]. Compared with other coding schemes, such
as LDPC code and Polar code, the spinal code is rateless code and has a
simple coding structure, so it is more adaptable to variable channel. In order
to make the proposed reconciliation algorithm easier to understand, we briefly
introduce the encoding and decoding principle of spinal code in this section.
2.1 Encoding spinal codes
The core of the spinal code is a hash function g, and a random number gener-
ator (RNG) known to both the transmitter and receiver. g is chosen uniformly
from a family of hash functions G, which takes two inputs: a v-bits state and
k message bits, and returns a new v-bits state. That is,
g : {0, 1}v × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}v (1)
The encoder maps n bits input message M = (b1, b2, · · · , bn) to a stream of
coded bits X1, X2, · · · , Xn/k using hash function and RNG. These coded bits
are transmitted in sequence until the receiver signals that it is done decoding.
The encoding process of Spinal codes is described as follows:
(1) Dividing n bits input message M into n/k groups, each group of k bits,
and producing a sequence of v-bits states called the spine by applied g
sequentially to mi. Let mi denotes bits bk(i−1)+1, bk(i−1)+2, · · · , bki, so the
sequence of states si is simply generated as
si = g(si−1,mi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n/k, (2)
where the initial state s0 is known to both the encoder and decoder.
(2) Each of these n/k spine values si is used to RNG repeatedly and mapped
to a longer binary sequence Qi = (q1, · · · , qτ , · · · ). RNG is a function,
which takes a v-bits state and another variable as inputs and generates a
sequence of τ bits, as follow
RNG : {0, 1}v × N→ {0, 1}τ . (3)
Because the requirements for RNG are similar to those for h, one suitable
choice for RNG is to combine h with a v-to-τ -bits shift register [37].
(3) Producing symbols xi,` as the `-th pass by acting a constellation mapping
function f on the `-th subsequence (q(`−1)c+1, · · · , q`c) of Qi with length of
c bits. The encoder continues generate additional symbols until the receiver
decode the message M successfully or both sides of communication to give
up on the message.
Let b be the decimal number of a c-bits input to the constellation mapping.
For the AWGN channel, the constellation mapping function f encodes the c-
bits input to a truncated Gaussian variable via the following mapping
f(b) = Φ−1(γ + (1− 2γ)α)
√
P ∗, (4)
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where α = 2b+12c+1 ,and Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
standard normal, γ = Φ(−β) limits the symbols in the range
[
−β√P ∗, β√P ∗
]
,
and within that range the symbols are distributed like a Gaussian N(0, P ∗),
β controls the truncation width, P ∗ is the modulation variance of truncated
Gaussian variables.
Fig. 1 Encoding process of Spinal code
2.2 Decoding spinal codes - Bubble Decoding
The central concept of decoding spinal codes is to search for the encoded mes-
sage that differs least from the received signal over a tree of message prefixes.
The decoding tree structure of the spinal code is shown as the figure. The root
of the decoding tree is s0, and corresponds to the zero-length message. Each
node at depth d corresponds to a prefix of length kd bits, and is labeled with
the final spine value sd of that prefix. Every node has 2
k children, connected
by edges e = (sd, sd+1) representing a choice of k message bits m¯e. As in the
encoder, sd+1 is h(sd, m¯e). By walking back up the tree to the root and reading
k bits from each edge, we can find the message prefix for a given node. To the
edge incident on node sd, we assign a branch cost ‖y¯d − x¯d(sd)‖2. Summing
branch costs on the path from the root to a node gives the path cost of that
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Fig. 2 Decoding tree of Spinal code
node, equivalent to the sum in Eq.5.
n/k∑
i=1
‖y¯i − x¯i(si)‖2 (5)
The Bubble algorithm is a strategy of pruning the decoding tree using
greedy algorithm. The B nodes with the smallest Euclidean distance are se-
lected in each level of decoding tree, and the B nodes form a set of candidate
nodes. Extend the subtree rooted at these B nodes. In decoding, each level
needs to be expanded to a maximum of B points. After calculation, B ·2k child
nodes are generated, the candidate node set is cleared, B · 2k child nodes are
sorted, and the optimal B nodes are selected again. Put in the set of candidate
nodes. The steps of the bubbling algorithm are as follows:
(1) Initialize the candidate node set and put the root node into the collection.
(2) Expand all the nodes in the set once to get B · 2k nodes, and clear the
candidate node set at this time. The data in the child node is updated,
including the Euclidean distance, depth, state value, and path from the
root node to the current node of the current node and the coded symbol
receiving sequence.
(3) Sort the B · 2k nodes according to the Euclidean distance, and put the B
nodes with the smallest distance into the candidate node set.
(4) If the depth of the point in the current candidate node set reaches n/k, the
node with the lowest cost among the candidate nodes is selected as the final
node of the decoding path, and the prefix in the final node corresponds
to the decoding result, and the decoding ends. When the depth does not
reach n/k, return to step 2.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 7
3 Reconciliation Protocol based on Spinal Code
In the previous section, we briefly introduced the spinal code. In this section,
we propose a novel reconciliation algorithm for practical CV-QKD systems
to distill common corrected keys from their correlated variables based on the
spinal code. In order to analyze the security of the protocol, we prove its
security from the perspective of information theory.
3.1 Reconciliation Protocol
The Gaussian-modulated coherent state CV-QKD is the most widely used
scheme with the current techniques. We hence only discuss the reconciliation
of CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation in this paper. After the quantum key
establishment phase of a Gaussian-modulated coherent state CV-QKD system,
Alice and Bob share weakly correlated continuous-variable raw data since the
noises during the quantum transmission including physical noise and add noise
from Eve. The noises can safely be assumed to be Gaussian since it corresponds
to the case of the optimal attack for Eve [39]. Let X = (x1, x2, · · · ) and
Y = (y1, y2, · · · ) corresponding to correlated Gaussian vectors of Alice and
Bob, respectively, then Y = X + Z with X ∼ N(0, VA), Z ∼ N(0, VZ) in
the direct reconciliation case, and and X = Y + Z ′ with Y ∼ N(0, VA+V ′Z),
Z ′ ∼ N(0, V ′Z) in the reverse reconciliation case, where VA is modulation
variance and VZ , V
′
Z are noise variances. For long-distance CV-QKD protocols,
the reverse reconciliation is required, which takes Bob’s sequence as target keys
to correct Alice’s, i.e., Bob is the encoder and Alice is the decoder. Without
loss of generality, we consider the reverse reconciliation.
Reviewing the traditional communication process with spinal code, it is
easy to understand that the quantum transmission of the CV-QKD corre-
sponds to the spinal symbols transmission of traditional communication. If we
can transfer the noise of quantum transmission to the spinal symbols, then a
virtual BWGN channel can be established for the reconciliation with spinal
code. Subsequently, spinal code can be used for the reconciliation of CV-QKD.
However, the concrete noise values of correlated Gaussian vectors are not
directly available. Fortunately, we design a way to securely and equivalently
transfer the noise, i.e., Bob calculates the differences ∆ = Y − C between
his raw data Y and spinal symbols C, and sends ∆ to Alice over the classic
authentication channel. Alice subsequently transfers the noise Z of CV-QKD
channel to spinal symbols C by subtracting the received differences ∆ from
his raw data X as the Eq.6, after which Alice obtains a noisy version C ′ of C
as
C ′ = X −∆ = C − Z. (6)
Since the symmetry of Z ∼ N(0, VZ), −Z follows the same distribution −Z ∼
N(0, VZ).
By using the above method, we associate the correlated continuous-variable
raw data with spinal codes. We now proceed to design a rate-compatible in-
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formation reconciliation protocol for CV-QKD using these preparations as
described above. At the beginning of reconciliation, the legitimate parties ran-
domly choose and agree on a hash function. The schematic of the proposed
protocol is plotted in Fig.3, of which the process is described in detail as
follows.
Step 1: Bob randomly generates a binary sequences M of length n as the
secret key, and then encodes M to spinal symbols C = (C1, C2, · · · , Cn/k)
through the spinal encoder.
In the encoding process, (i) spinal encoder firstly generates spine values
si = g(si−1,mi) of each subblock mi; (ii) Then setting si and tj , j = 1, 2, · · ·
as seeds of RNG to obtain binary sequence Bi and orderly acting function on
subsequence of Bi to generate spinal symbols Ci = (ci1, ci2, · · · , cil), where
s0 and tj are pre-shared secret data of Alice and Bob. The pass number l
is initially set as lmin which calculated according to the practical SNR of the
quantum channel as Eq.7. When the modulation variance of the Spinal encoder
set as P ∗, the SNR of virtual AWGN channel is S′NR = P
∗/VZ . According
to Shannon information theory, Bob needs to send at least lmin passes for
correcting successfully.
lmin =
⌈
k
0.5 log(1 + S′NR)
⌉
=
⌈
k
0.5 log(1 + P
∗
VA
SNR)
⌉
, (7)
where SNR denotes the practical SNR of CV-QKD system, dxe is the ceiling
function, the log is to the base 2 and entropy is expressed in bits.
Step 2: Bob calculates the differences ∆i by subtracting his raw data y1, y2,
y3, · · · with the spinal symbols c11, · · · , c1l, c21, · · · , c2l, · · · orderly, and then
sends the differences ∆i, i = 1, 2, · · · , nl/k to Alice over the classical authentic
channel.
Step 3: Alice subtracts the received differences ∆i from the corresponding
raw data x1, x2, x3, · · · on his hand to obtain the side information c′11, c′12, · · · ,
which are the noisy version of c11, c12, · · · . Then Alice uses the Bubble decoder
to produces the estimated message Mˆ of M with the prepared side information
c′11, c
′
12, · · · and the pre-shared s0, tj , j = 1, 2, · · · .
Mˆ = arg min
M ′∈{0,1}n
‖c′ − c¯(M ′)‖2, (8)
where c¯(X) is an encoder function that yields the vector of symbols for a
message X.
Step 4: Alice performs a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) check to verify the
decoded message Mˆ . If the CRC results of Mˆ and M are equal, then the key
string M gets decoded successfully, otherwise Alice informs Bob to generates
and sends additional difference information until the latest updated message
Mˆ pass CRC check or the decoding number reaches the predefined maximum
number imax.
The schematic diagram of the novel reconciliation protocol is shown as
Fig.3. It is noted here that even if all CRC constraints are satisfied, there
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Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of the novel reconciliation scheme based on spinal code for CV-
QKD
may exists undetected errors. But this situation rarely appears and can be
neglected, since the probability of any other message M ′ having likelihood
higher than M is made exponentially small in the message length n [40],
besides, collision of CRC also occurs with a extremely low probability.
3.2 Performance analysis of protocol
Now that the novel reconciliation protocol based on spinal code for CV-QKD
has been proposed, it is necessary to consider the performance of our protocol.
In this section, we investigate the performance of the proposed reconciliation
protocol from two aspects including the security and reconciliation efficiency.
3.2.1 Security analysis
According to the proposed reconciliation protocol, the information that Eve
obtains by monitoring the classic channel includes the differences ∆ and check
information U used for CRC, which are together denoted as Γ . In addition,
during the coherent states transmission over the quantum channel, Eve maybe
obtain some information, which we note as E, about the correlated raw data.
In order to discuss the security of the proposed reconciliation protocol, it is
equivalent to investigate how much information about the key M will leaked
in the case that Eve knows E and Γ . We have the conclusion presented in the
following Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1 Let M be a random n-bits string with uniform distribution,
let G be the hash function of spinal encoder chosen at random from a family
of hash functions G:{0, 1}v × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}v, S and T be the random ini-
tial state of the hash function G and one seed of RNG in the spinal encoder
respectively, and let E and T denote the information Eve obtained through
the quantum channel and classic channel respectively, and U denotes the λ
bits check codes used for CRC. If Alice and Bob share secret random strings
s = {0, 1}v and t = {0, 1}ω as the starting states of hash function and RNG of
the proposed reconciliation respectively, then Eve’s expected information about
M , given Γ and E, satisfies
I(M ;G,Γ,E) <
n
2v+ω
+ λ
Proof According to the chain rule of mutual information, we expand the
leaked information I(M ;G,Γ,E) as
I(M ;G,Γ,E) = I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E)− I(S, T ;G,Γ,E|M) (9)
Since the mutual information is non-negative, we have
I(M ;G,Γ,E) ≤ I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E) (10)
We now discuss I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E) to indirectly derive the upper bound of
I(M ;G,Γ,E). Similarly, we use chain rule of mutual information, it can be
express as
I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E) = I(S, T ;G,Γ,E) + I(M ;G,Γ,E|S, T ) (11)
Since the spinal codes sequentially apply hash function and RNG to the mes-
sage bits to produce coded symbols for transmission, it presents a framework
for making Shannon’s random coding ideas, i.e., the output of spinal encoder is
random and sensitive to input. It ensures that two input of spinal encoder that
differ in even one bit lead to very different coded symbols [37]. Therefore, even
if G,Γ,E is given, Eve still knows nothing about S and T without knowing M .
In addition, S and T are random strings. Then, we have I(S, T ;G,Γ,E) = 0.
Averaging over values of S and T , we can further obtain that
I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E) = I(M ;G,Γ,E|S, T )
= P (S = s, T = t)I(M ;G,Γ,E|S = s, T = t) +∑
x ∈ {0, 1}v\s
y ∈ {0, 1}ω\t
P (S = x, T = y)I(M ;G,Γ,E|S = x, T = y),
(12)
where {0, 1}v\s denotes the set excluding S = s. P (S, T ) is the probability
distribution of S and T . Because S, T are random and independent strings,
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for any x ∈ {0, 1}v, y ∈ {0, 1}ω, x and y are equally likely candidates for S
and T . Then, P (S = x, T = y) = 1/2v+ω.
We first discuss the first term on the left side of Eq.12. From the perspective
of Eve, if he knows S = s and T = t, it is equivalent to establishing a virtual
channel with signal-to-noise ratio SeNR, where the differences −∆ = C−Y can
be regarded as a noise version of the spinal symbol C added noise Y . There-
fore, using Shannon information theory and conditional mutual information
formula, I(M ;G,Γ,E|S = s, T = t) can be expanded and bounded as
I(M ;G,Γ,E|S = s, T = t) = H(M |S = s, T = t)−H(M |S = s, T = t, G, Γ,E)
≤ H(M)−H(M |S = s, T = t, G, Γ,E)
= n−max{n− N
2
log(1 + SeNR), 0}
≤ n,
(13)
where N is the length of differences ∆. SeNR =
P∗
VB
, where P ∗ and VB denote
the modulation variance of the spinal symbol C and Bob’s measured raw data
Y , respectively.
Next, we discuss the second item. For u ∈ {0, 1}λ, let cu be the number
of m ∈ {0, 1}n that are consistent with u, i.e., satisfying CRC(m) = u. Since
M is random string, then P (U = u) = cu/2
n. As mentioned in the previous,
the output of spinal codes is random and sensitive to input [37]. For two
different inputs, their outputs of the spinal codes are independent of each other
[38]. Hence, Eve cannot learn any information about M using his obtained
information G,Γ,E when x 6= s and y 6= t, i.e., for any x 6= s and y 6= t, all
consistent m with CRC(m) = u are equally likely candidates, then P (M |S =
x, T = y, U = u,G,E,∆) = 1cu . Therefore, we have
I(M ;G,Γ,E|S = x, T = y) = H(M)−H(M |S = x, T = y,G, Γ,E)
= n−
∑
u∈{0,1}λ
P (U = u)H(M |S = x, T = y, U = u,G,E,∆)
= n−
∑
u∈{0,1}λ
cu
2n
log cu
=
∑
u∈{0,1}λ
cu
2n
log
2n
cu
≤ λ.
(14)
According to the above discussion, then we derived that
I(M,S, T ;G,Γ,E) ≤ n
2v+ω
+
∑
x∈{0,1}v\s,y∈{0,1}ω\t
λ
2v+ω
<
n
2v+ω
+ λ,
(15)
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combining with Eq.10∼Eq.15, we finally get
I(M ;G,Γ,E) <
n
2v+ω
+ λ. (16)
The Theorem1 indicates that, if we distill n-bits corrected keys M using
the proposed reconciliation protocol, Eve can obtain n2v+ω +λ bits partial infor-
mation about M at most. One can eliminate the leaked information in privacy
amplification stage by performing a universal hash function on a larger body
of corrected keys at a compression rate r ≈ 1 − (λn + 12v+ω ). After that, the
partially secret keys can be distilled to the highly secret keys which can be
used directly as finial secret keys.
3.2.2 Reconciliation efficiency analysis
Let us now discuss the proposed protocol’s reconciliation efficiency, which is
a significant indicator to evaluate the performance of the information recon-
ciliation step. Because our works focus on CV-QKD system with Gaussian
modulation. We have to take into account that our quantum channel is Gaus-
sian, and then the reconciliation efficiencies with respect to Gaussian channel
capacity is computed as follow
β =
R
C(SNR)
, (17)
where R is the rate of reconciliation protocol and C(SNR) =
1
2 log(1 + SNR)
is the classical capacity of the quantum channel for Gaussian variables.
The code rate of the spinal codes in traditional communication is R′ =
n
(Ln/k) , where L is the passes number of spinal symbols transmission. L is not
fixed, since spinal codes are able to take advantage of channel variations and
the produces the spinal symbols to receiver at a higher code rate prior to a
lower code rate. This is why spinal code is rateless code. However, the tradi-
tional communication does not need to consider the leakage and consumption
of the message M . Therefore, we should define the R with considering the se-
curity. Next, let us investigate the code rate R of our proposed reconciliation
protocol.
In our proposed protocol, the maximum leaked information about the cor-
rect keys M is n/2v+ω + λ according to the Theorem 1. This is based on the
pre-shared secure data s and t of total length v + ω bits, which needs to con-
sume the final secret keys. We know that the final secret key is converted from
the correct key at a certain compress-ratio r by performing a privacy amplifi-
cation, i.e., it is indirectly equivalent to consume (v + ω)/r bits correct keys
for reconciliation. Hence, the remaining correct keys of the proposed protocol
are n− (n/2v+ω + λ)− (v+ω)/r bits with considering the security, and these
correct keys are extracted from nL/k bits correlated raw data of the legitimate
parties. Therefore, the code rate R of the proposed reconciliation protocol is
given by
R =
k [n− (n/2v+ω + λ)− (v + ω)/r]
nL
. (18)
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In practical systems, for a fixed optical transmission distance between Alice
and Bob, the reconciliation efficiency can be optimized by tuning the modu-
lation variance of spinal codes. Now, let us investigate the adjustable range
of modulation variance P ∗. Obviously, the code rate R reaches its maximum
when L = lmin, and then the reconciliation efficiency β achieves maximum in
this case. According to the Shannon information theory, it is satisfied that
2k [n− (n/2v+ω + λ)− (v + ω)/r]
nlmin log(1 + SNR)
≤ 1, (19)
as we discussed previous, n/2v+ω is very small and then can be ignored, and
ω = wlmincv , where w is the length of another input N of RNG. Then, the Eq.19
is approximately expressed as
n− λ− v
2 log(1 + SNR
′) + 2kwc
vr log(1 + SNR
′)
≤ n log(1 + SNR)
log(1 + SNR
′)
, (20)
where SNR
′ = P
∗
VZ
. By solving Eq.20, we can get the range of the modulation
variance of spinal symbols as follow
P ∗ ≤ (2
η − 1)VA
SNR
, (21)
where η = vrn log(1+SNR)+2kcwvr(n−v/r−d) .
4 Simulation and analysis
In this section, the simulation experiments are performed to show the perfor-
mance of the proposed reconciliation protocol. Also, the comparative simula-
tions between reconciliation scheme in [18] and our scheme are carried out.
4.1 Parameter setting
Hash function h. Spinal codes rely on the mixing ability of the hash function
to provide the output independence. The existing research works in [18] sim-
ulated the performance of three widely used hash function Salsa20, lookup3.1
and one-at-a-time, and showed no discernible difference in performance be-
tween these three hash functions in spinal codes. But the processing speed of
one-at-a-time hash function is fastest compared with the other hash functions.
We used one-at-a-time in our experiments.
RNG. Since the hash function possesses the mixing ability, we use one-at-
a-time to implement RNG. The encoder and decoder call g(si, tj) to generate
longer output symbols. This method has the desirable property that not every
output symbol has to be generated in sequence, i.e., if some frames containing
symbols are not recovered, the decoder need not generate the missing symbols.
Block length n. The longer block length n lead a higher reconciliation efficiency.
14 Xuan Wen et al.
However, the complexity of reconciliation scheme will increase with the block
length. In our experiments, we set the block length n = 1024.
Picking k, B and c. We know that k and B have the greatest impact on
determining the complexity of the reconciliation. Larger values of k don’t do
well at low compute budgets, but smaller values of k underperform at higher
SNRs. Each decoder can use a value of B according to its price performance
ratio. We set k = 4, B = 256, c = 6 in our experiments referring to the
literature [18].
SNR. A particular challenge of long distance CV-QKD systems is achiev-
ing the high-performance reconciliation at low SNR (normally lower than 0.5)
of the quantum channel. So we only measure performance across an SNR range
(0, 0.5) in our experiments.
Other parameters. In fact, for the fixed noise variance, changing mod-
ulation variance VA leads to different SNR values, i.e., it is equivalent to ad-
justing the VA by taking different value of SNR. Without loss of generally, we
set modulation variance of Alice as VA = 1. The modulation variance of trun-
cated Gaussian variable (spinal symbol) is set as P ∗= (2
η−1)VA
SNR
, the maximum
iteration number is set as imax = 50.
4.2 Experiments results and analysis
We mainly display the reconciliation performance of the proposed information
protocol in terms of reconciliation efficiency, frame error rate (FER) and it-
eration number of decoding, which are important indicators to evaluate the
reconciliation performance. Since reference [18] only listed the experimental
results of the reconciliation efficiency, the comparative experiments between
scheme in [18] and our scheme are only carried out for the reconciliation effi-
ciency. To the best of our knowledge, performance of the existing reconciliation
scheme [13, 17, 18] is normally simulated at a given SNR, i.e., assuming the
SNR of quantum channel is accurately known to the communication parties.
However, as we all known, the SNR of quantum channel in practical CV-QKD
systems is estimated by the parameter estimation stage. Due to the finite-size
effect, there exist statistical fluctuation in parameter estimation, and then it
is difficult to accurately estimate the true value of SNR. Take this situation
into account, we performed some additional experimental simulations at the
estimated SNR value differs from its true value. All the experiments at each
SNR average the performance over 100 data blocks.
4.2.1 Reconciliation efficiency
Table.1 gives a comparison of the reconciliation efficiency between the scheme
in reference [18] and our proposed scheme. According to the table, it can be
seen that our scheme generally performs better than the reference [18] almost
for every SNR. In addition, the reconciliation efficiencies of our scheme in a
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Table 1 Reconciliation efficiency comparison between scheme in Ref. [18] and proposed
scheme
SNR Proposed Ref.[18] SNR Proposed Ref.[18]
0.0277 96.89% 96.40% 0.077 95.94% 95.68%
0.0280 97.16% 96.38% 0.079 96.13% 95.36%
0.0286 96.62% 96.36% 0.081 95.76% 95.22%
0.0299 96.68% 96.46% 0.143 93.29% 93.35%
0.0306 96.59% 96.59% 0.148 95.23% 93.41%
0.0314 96.85% 96.40% 0.153 95.19% 93.48%
0.0690 95.16% 95.16% 0.163 95.50% 93.64%
0.0710 95.58% 95.39% 0.169 94.92% 93.22%
0.0730 95.18% 95.43% 0.176 94.60% 93.21%
larger range of SNRs is given by Fig.4, which shows that our scheme always
achieve the reconciliation efficiency stably around 95%.
These simulation results indicate that our solution can achieve a high-
performance and stable adaptive reconciliation for varying SNR. This is be-
cause our scheme is a rateless reconciliation protocl and always produce the
symbols at a higher code rate prior to a lower code rate.
Fig. 4 Reconciliation efficiency of the proposed reconciliation protocol
4.2.2 Frame error rate
The FER refers to the failure probability of reconciliation, which has a great
influence on the secret key rate of CV-QKD system. It is also an important
indicator of reconciliation performance. Fig.6 shows the FER of the proposed
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Fig. 5 The proposed reconciliation protocol approaches to Shannon bound
reconciliation protocol. It indicates that our reconciliation protocol can finish
the adaptive reconciliation with almost 100% success rate.
Fig. 6 Frame error rate of the proposed reconciliation protocol
4.2.3 Iteration number of decoding
We simulate and record the average iteration number of a data block decoding
to reflect the decoding speed of our reconciliation algorithm indirectly. Fig.7
shows that the proposed reconciliation scheme finish the reconciliation only
requires a very small number of iterations.
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Fig. 7 Iteration number of decoding of the proposed reconciliation protocol
It is noted that, although the total decoding cost scales of one iteration is
O(nB2k(k + logB + v)), the cost calculation of the B · 2k candidate nodes of
each depth is independent of each other. Therefore, decoder of spinal codes is
very suitable for using parallel algorithms to achieve competitive throughput.
But accelerating the throughput of decoder is currently not considered in this
paper.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel rate-adaptive information reconciliation pro-
tocol for practical CV-QKD systems based on spinal code. Compared with the
existing adaptive reconciliation algorithm based on the LDPC code, our pro-
posed protocol does not need to design the check matrices for different SNRs,
which greatly reduces the design cost and memory resource consumption. In
addition, we proved the security of the proposed protocol based on information
theory. Simulation experiments show that the reconciliation efficiency of our
protocol can achieve about 95% for the ranging SNRs. That is to say, our pro-
tocol can realize adaptive and high-efficiency information reconciliation under
the premise of ensuring security.
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